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Penalising on the basis of the severity of the offence: 










In Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015) we examined the welfare properties of a 
number of monetary penalty regimes for tackling cartels, including revenue-based penalties 
(the most widely used regime), illegal gains-based penalties, and overcharge–based penalties. 
We showed that the latter regime welfare-dominates the others. However it is subject to 
criticism on the grounds of legal uncertainty and high implementation costs. In this paper we 
focus on analysing an alternative regime: a sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime in 
which the penalty base is the revenue of the cartel but the penalty rate depends on (and 
increases with) the cartel overcharge rate. Thus, in contrast to the currently employed simple 
revenue-based regime, the proposed regime penalises cartels taking also into account the 
severity of their offence in terms of the height of their overcharge. We show that this hybrid 
regime can effectively replicate the desirable welfare properties of an overcharge-based 
penalty structure while having very low levels of legal uncertainty and implementation costs.  
 
JEL Classification: L4 Antitrust Policy, K21 Antitrust Law, D43 Oligopoly and Other 
Forms of Market Imperfection. 
 




1We are grateful to Joe Harrington, Frederic Jenny and Tom Ross for helpful discussions and comments and to 
the Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Short-term Visitor Program for financial support.  
2Department of Economic Science, Athens University of Economics and Business, Patission 76, Athens 104 34, 
Greece. Email: ysk@hol.gr 
3Department of Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, TILEC and Tinbergen Institute, De Boelelaan 1105, 
1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands.  Email: emotchenkova@feweb.vu.nl  
4 School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews St Andrews, KY16 9AR, Scotland. Email: 
du1@st-andrews.ac.uk 




The imposition of sanctions have been regarded as the most important ex ante 
intervention instrument that Competition Authorities (hereafter CAs) can use in antitrust and, 
more specifically, cartel violations.5 Their continuing significance is confirmed by extensive 
empirical evidence which suggests that cartels are still very active throughout the world and 
pervasive in a variety of markets.6  
The current paper concentrates on sanctioning methods as a part of the public 
enforcement of Competition Law on cartel cases.7 There is a variety of different types of 
sanctions with different emphasis placed on each type over time and in different countries. In 
this paper we concentrate on financial, or monetary, penalties on corporations.8 Our main 
objective is to contribute to the growing recent literature on monetary penalty regimes9 by 
suggesting an alternative regime to the ones currently utilised or that have been proposed in 
the recent literature, which, as we show below, is superior to all these other regimes when 
account is taken of a number of assessment criteria for evaluating them.  
While economists have concentrated on a comparison of the welfare properties of the 
different regimes, and while this comparison is very important in identifying regimes that are 
superior in terms of their welfare impact, in order for the comparison to have policy 
significance, that is in order to guide policy makers in making choices of the sanctioning 
policy that should be adopted by CAs, a number of other policy-relevant dimensions of the 
                                                            
5 The theory of sanctioning on dominant firm abuses is still undeveloped . Other important ex ante instruments 
of competition law enforcement in the area of cartels are the prohibition of facilitating practices (which can 
increase the viability of cartels) and the use of merger policy (to reduce the likelihood of cartels emerging after 
mergers). Ex post measures include the improvement of detection and prosecution rates, the adoption of 
measures to keep industries competitive after prosecution (prevent recidivism) and the application of leniency 
policies. 
6 See e.g. Levenstein and Suslow (2011, 2012, 2014), Schinkel (2007),  Veljanovski (2007), Connor and Lande 
(2008), Allain et al. (2011), Boyer and Kotchoni (2015) or Spagnolo and Marvão (2016) for an overview. 
7 There is a distinction between public enforcement sanctioning and private damage actions as these serve 
primarily different purposes. Public enforcement focuses on the detection and investigation of cartels the 
objective being to bring cartel activity to an end and imposing sanctions for infringements which aims to punish 
and to deter future violations. Private damages on the other hand, focus on compensating those who have 
suffered harm. So, the two methods are complementary but each can contribute to the objectives of the other. 
Public enforcement can facilitate and stimulate private damage actions and private damage actions can 
contribute to deterrence and provide incentives to customers to discover and report price-fixing. 
8 The other main types of sanctions in public enforcement are: financial penalties on managers involved in price-
fixing, criminal sanctions/imprisonment of individuals involved in price-fixing, debarment of individuals 
involved in price-fixing, from further employment in a position from which they could again violate antitrust 
laws. See for a review Katsoulacos et al. (2017). 
9 See e.g. Harrington (2004, 2005), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007), Harrington (2010), Houba et al. (2010), 




regimes have to be assessed and compared. Specifically, a complete comparison has to take 
into account the following three dimensions / assessment criteria: 
(i) Implementability.  This involves considerations relating to the administrative 
cost of the penalty regime,10 the extent to which it minimises delays in the CA 
enforcement process11 and the extent to which it minimises the costs of appeals in 
the judicial review process.12 The latter will be higher the more the appeals that 
are induced, against the CA’s penalty decisions, by a penalty regime. The number 
of appeals will be greater the more likely it is that the penalty regime can lead to 
estimation errors and/or when penalty decisions can be easily challenged as been  
discriminatory.  
(ii) Legal Certainty. Penalty regimes differ in terms of how easily and accurately 
firms can predict the fine that they will be facing IF they are prosecuted and are 
found to violate the law. When firms cannot predict the estimates of penalties that 
the CA will make were it to investigate and condemn their conduct we have legal 
uncertainty. Since penalties are generally calculated as a fraction of a “penalty 
base” (such as revenues or profits) and since penalty guidelines only specify that 
this fraction (the “penalty rate”)13 will fall within a range that will depend on a 
large number of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, there is always some 
legal uncertainty in predicting the CA’s penalty estimate in any specific case. This 
uncertainty increases as it becomes more difficult to obtain accurate estimates of 
the “penalty base” and to calculate the appropriate “penalty rate”.  
(iii) Welfare properties. While the traditional economics literature has identified first-
best optimal penalties, emphasizing their deterrence properties, the more recent 
literature has focused on comparing penalty regimes in a second-best world. Since 
it is then assumed that, as is true in practice, penalties cannot be set so as to deter 
all or even most cartels,14 it is important to address also the price effects of the 
                                                            
10 The cost required in order to collect the necessary information and to undertake the estimation of the penalty 
by the CA and the firms. 
11 The more the information required by a penalty regime and the more difficult it is to obtain reliable data on 
this information the more lengthy will be the process of estimation and hence the greater the delay in reaching 
decisions.  
12 That is, the cost for the CA of defending its decisions in Courts of Appeal and the cost that the firms have to 
incur when appealing against the CA’s decisions. 
13 So the penalty is equal to the product of the penalty base (e.g. revenue) and the penalty rate chosen when a 
given base is chosen.  
14 For example, due to bankruptcy considerations and in order not to violate the legal “proportionality principle” 
(see also below) most countries have legal ceilings on antitrust fines set at 10% of annual turnover. Many 
authors showed that this penalty is insufficient (see e.g. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007), Harrington (2010), 
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penalty regimes on cartels that are not deterred. So, a proper second-best welfare 
comparison has to take into account of both the deterrence and the price effects of 
penalty regimes. The most extensive and rigorous recent comparison of the 
welfare properties of the penalty regimes described below is contained in 
Katsoulacos et al. (2015). 
Clearly a penalty regime is better than another one if it easier to implement, it generates less 
legal uncertainty and has a superior overall welfare impact. Unfortunately, regimes that are 
superior in terms of their welfare properties are not superior (and may be inferior) in terms of 
the other assessment criteria we mentioned above. This makes it very difficult to translate 
results regarding the welfare properties of different regimes into proposals concerning which 
of these regimes should be adopted and implemented by CAs in practice.  
The literature on the optimal design of antitrust monetary penalties has examined four 
main regimes: damages-based regime, illegal gains-based regime, revenue–based regime and 
overcharge–based regime. In this paper we focus on analysing an alternative (fifth) regime: 
the sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime in which the penalty base is the revenue of 
the cartel but the penalty rate depends on (and increases with) the cartel overcharge rate (see  
for more details the next section). Thus, in contrast to the currently employed simple revenue-
based regime, the proposed  regime penalises cartels taking also into account the severity of 
their offence in terms of the height of their overcharge. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief descriptions of the 
main penalty regimes including the one proposed in this paper and of how they perform in 
relation to the three assessment criteria above. Section 3 analyses price effects and deterrence 
properties of the sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime and shows its superiority. 
Section 4 offers a brief comparison with other penalty regimes while section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Brief review of alternative monetary penalty regimes and main results  
The existing literature has identified and analysed four main monetary penalty regimes. 
Below we start with brief descriptions of these regimes and of an alternative (fifth) regime, 
which we analyse in this paper and of how they perform in relation to the three assessment 
criteria above.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Bageri et al. (2013) and Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013)). As a result these ceilings make antitrust policies either 
completely ineffective or at best partially effective in such a way that only low prices are deterred, while high 
prices are still sustainable. See also Houba et al. (2017) for more detailed discussion. 
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1. Damages-based regime. That penalties should be based on the damages that the 
unlawful conduct generates to others was proposed in the seminal article of Becker 
(1968) examining optimal (first-best) penalties – under the assumption that the 
objective of the enforcing agency is to maximise (total) social welfare. However, 
damages to others are very difficult to estimate accurately and their estimation is 
likely to be subject to quite significant errors. Thus though the welfare properties of 
damage-based penalties are very good, inducing cartel prices that are below the 
monopoly level,15 such penalties have very significant implementability problems and 
can create a significant amount of legal uncertainty. For these reasons they have never 
formed the basis of antitrust sanctioning in practice.  
2. Illegal gains-based regime. Penalties based on illegal gains were early identified for 
their welfare properties and their adoption was proposed most forcefully by Lande 
(1982) as most appropriate for enforcing authorities whose objective is to deter 
conduct that does not generate any efficiencies (such as price fixing) in order to avoid 
the reduction in consumer surplus that results from such conduct. Illegal gains are 
defined as cartel’s profits over and above the counterfactual level of profits.16 The 
welfare properties of these penalties in a second-best world17 are not very good since 
they induce cartel prices that are equal to the monopoly level.18 Further, as explained 
in Figure 3 in Appendix 1, it is difficult to estimate accurately illegal-gains based 
penalties in most cases and their estimation is likely to be subject to quite significant 
errors. Thus, such penalties have significant implementability problems and can create 
a significant amount of legal uncertainty. Nevertheless, because they are thought to 
have very good welfare properties through dissuasion of cartel activity they are 
included in the penalty structures adopted in many countries, though they are very 
rarely implemented as in practice antitrust authorities mainly use revenue-based 
structures. 
3. Revenue–based regime. This is the regime most often adopted and implemented by 
CAs for estimating monetary penalties throughout the world. The main reason seems 
                                                            
15 See also Appendix 1 for detailed derivations.  
16 In the special case where the counterfactual price is the marginal cost (competitive price), the illegal gains are 
the same as the cartel profits.  
17 Where penalties are lower than their first best-level of illegal gains weighted by the inverse probability that 
the illegal conduct is detected and penalized and, therefore, cartels do form and survive for long periods of time. 
Adopting first-best penalties would violate the legal “principle of proportionality” and would create very 
significant legal uncertainty. 
18 See Bageri et al. (2013), Katsoulacos et al. (2015) and Appendix 1 for a brief description and formal 
arguments that support this result. 
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to be that it scores very high in terms of easiness of  implementability and also legal 
uncertainty problems are minimized. On the other hand, as the recent theoretical 
literature has emphasized, revenue-based regimes are very weak in terms of their 
welfare properties. In particular, when their “toughness” is set so as to generate the 
same deterrence as other regimes,19 revenue-based regimes generates prices above the 
monopoly level as well as a number of other distortions (see Bageri et al. (2013), 
Katsoulacos et al. (2015)).  
4. Overcharge-based regime. This has been shown to be superior in terms of its overall 
welfare impact relative to the revenue-based and profit-based regimes (see 
Katsoulacos et al., 2015).   However, its calculation is based on obtaining estimates of 
the overcharge (the difference between the cartel and the counterfactual price) and, 
more importantly, the counterfactual volume of sales.20 This implies that this regime 
is difficult to implement and creates substantial legal uncertainty.  
In this paper we propose an alternative penalty regime and examine its properties, the 
following.  
5. Sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime. In this, the penalty base is the revenue of 
the cartel but the penalty rate depends on (and increases with) the cartel overcharge 
rate. So, in calculating the penalty, the CA needs to estimate revenue, as under the 
revenue-based regime and also has to estimate the price overcharge, as under the 
damages-based, illegal gains-based and overcharge-based regimes. In the latter three 
regimes, however, additional information is required in order to obtain an accurate 
estimate of the penalty base, on top of that related to the overcharge, information 
which is quite hard to obtain and is easily open to dispute. Specifically, for an 
estimate of the illegal gains-based penalty one must also calculate how the but-for 
output and price differ from the output and price corresponding to perfectly 
competitive situation.21 Thus our proposed regime is relatively easier to implement 
and performs well on legal uncertainty - better in terms of these assessment criteria 
than the damages-based, illegal gains-based and overcharge-based regimes. Further, 
while it is inferior on implementability and legal uncertainty compared to the revenue-
                                                            
19 That is, when they are deterrent-equivalent to other regimes.  
20 It is the product of these that forms the “penalty base” of this regime. 
21 See also the discussion below (with Figure 3) and the Appendix 1 clarify this contention. 
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based regime it is, as we show below, much better than the latter (and similar to the 
overcharge based regime) on welfare grounds.22  
 
The following Table summarizes the above discussion and the conclusions reached in 
Section 3. 
Table 1 















Damages-based High High Strong 
Illegal gains-based High High Moderate 
Overcharge-based High High Strong 
Revenue-based Low Low Poor 
Sophisticated 
revenue-based 
Moderate Moderate / Low Strong 
 
As mentioned above, most CAs throughout the world have guidelines on the calculation 
and imposition of antitrust penalties that prescribe revenue-based monetary penalties for 
cartels in which the penalty rate depends on a number of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances but not on the cartel overcharge.23 Many countries also provide in their statues 
for the imposition of penalties based on illegal gains (see e.g. antitrust fining guidelines of the 
US, Germany, Chile, or China).24 In these cases, it is interesting to note that the penalties 
based on illegal gains are supposed to constitute an additional penalty that is combined with 
the revenue-based penalty in order to reach the overall penalty figure imposed on law 
violators. However, illegal gains-based penalties are rarely implemented – for example in US 
in only one case has the imposition of a penalty based on illegal gains been implemented.25 
Nevertheless, in many of the younger jurisdictions in which competition law in relation to the 
imposition of sanctions is formulated, CAs have opted for including illegal gains-based 
penalties as an potential additional element that can be taken into account in calculating 
                                                            
22 It is also better or not worse, with respect to welfare criterion, than the other regimes – damages-based and 
illegal gains-based. 
23 See for example Bageri and Katsoulacos (2014). 
24 For detailed overview of the penalty structures implemented in OECD countries see OECD Report (2002). 
25 As we have been informed in a private communication with Greg Werden. 
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monetary penalties26, though this has not improved the implementation record of illegal 
gains-based penalties because of the difficulties in their estimation and the legal uncertainty 
that they create27 – despite their having a more favourable welfare impact than revenue-based 
regimes.  
Our main contribution in this paper is to show that a sophisticated revenue-based 
regime has superior welfare properties that replicate the welfare properties of an overcharge-
based regime demonstrated in Katsoulacos et.al (2015) and is also superior in terms of the 
other two assessment criteria (implementability and legal uncertainty). And, this regime can 
achieve its superior welfare impact without being combined with any other penalty regimes.  
So, in section 3 – the bulk of the paper - we focus on examining the sophisticated 
revenue-based regime and showing that it has the same welfare properties as the overcharge –
based regime – which, as we have previously shown, welfare dominates others - but avoids 
its problems of legal uncertainty and implementability.  We also undertake a systematic 
comparison with the simple revenue-based penalty regime that is currently widely employed, 
showing that the sophisticated regime will achieve lower prices and can outperform it in 
terms of deterrence. In Section 4 we undertake a brief comparison with other penalty regimes. 
Section 5 offers our conclusion that such a modification of the current revenue-based 
structure may have a significant positive impact, if adopted by CAs. 
 
3.  Analysis of a sophisticated revenue-based regime 
In this section we derive the welfare properties of what we call a sophisticated revenue-
based penalty regime whereby the base for the penalty is the revenue actually earned by any 
cartel that a CA successfully prosecutes, but where the penalty rate applied to that base varies 
depending on the (percentage) overcharge, θ, that was set by the cartel, according to a 
formula   0   . Moreover, in order to avoid legal uncertainty we take it that this formula 
is the same across all cartel cases and is pre-announced.28  
                                                            
26 For example, on 17 June 2016, the Chinese CA enforcing CL in the area of price-related anticompetitive 
conduct (NDRC) published “Draft Guidelines on the Determination of Illegal Gains and Fines in Relation to 
Undertakings’ Monopoly Conduct which are expected to be introduced formally this year. With these 
Guidelines the NDRC attempts to make illegal-gains an important part of penalty setting in China and this has 
been commended by Koren W Wong-Ervin et.al.(2016) – the Chinese authorities have tried to calculate illegal 
gains in setting penalties in only about 10% of the cases since 2008 when the anti-monopoly law was 
introduced.  Also Chilean Competition Authority has adopted penalties based on illegal gains in 2014. 
27 “Difficult to be estimated” and “Easy to be challenged” is the standard way of explaining why penalties based 
on illegal gains are rarely used. Appendix 1 also provides more formal analysis to support these arguments. 
28 In practice CAs often adjust penalties to reward/punish other behaviours such how cooperative firms have 
been in assisting the investigation.  Since we don’t model these other behaviours we will focus on the adjusted 
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More specifically our aim is to determine the class of such penalty-rate functions that 
share the major property of overcharge-based penalty regimes, namely that they induce all 
cartels to set an overcharge that is below the monopoly overcharge.  In addition, in this 
section we will contrast the performance of such a sophisticated revenue-based penalty 
regime with that of the widely used simple revenue-based penalty regime in which the 
penalty rate applied to cartel revenue is independent of the overcharge set by cartels but, 
again for reasons of legal certainty, is also pre-announced and constant across all cartel cases.  
In the following section we will compare the performance of the sophisticated revenue-based 
penalty regime with that of other penalty regimes. 
 
3.1 Model Setup 
The model is the repeated game model of cartel formation and pricing behaviour 
employed in Katsoulacos et al. (2015), though it is specified differently since, given the 
structure of the penalty regime, the cartel overcharge is the key decision variable of interest in 
the current paper. We consider an economy comprising a range of industries. There are n 
firms in the industry producing a homogeneous product, each having the same constant unit 
costs of production, 0c  . Demand for this product is given by the downward-sloping 









    is non-
decreasing in p and   s.t. . We assume the counterfactual to be 
Bertrand competition with the “but-for” price equal to c and the “but-for” output equal to 
( )Q c . For a cartel to have any effective ability to raise price, above the “but-for” price all n 
firms will have to be members. So, an industry is characterised by the industry parameters: n, 
c, Q(p) and hence ( )p .   
If a cartel forms and sets a price p c  then the percentage overcharge is 
p c
c
   .  
So (1 )p c   . For any given overcharge set by the cartel the associated operating profits, π, 
(respectively revenue, R)  will be     (1 , resp. (1 ) (1c Q c R c Q c         .  
There is a Competition Authority (CA) that investigates, discovers, prosecutes and 
penalises cartels.  Let , 0 1    be the constant probability that in each period a cartel is 
detected, successfully prosecuted and penalised according to the penalty schedule specified 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
penalty, and how it should be set in relation to the behaviours that we do model: cartel formation and the cartel 
pricing decision.   
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above. We assume that the value of β is known by all firms at the time they decide to form a 
cartel and determine what price the cartel will set. We assume that, in the course of its 
investigation into any given cartel case, k, the CA discovers the overcharge, k  set by that 
cartel and the revenue kR earned by the cartel, and so calculates the penalty  k kR  that it 
will impose in that case. Since there is a single pre-announced formula,    , the cartel can 
in principle calculate for every overcharge θ it might want to set the penalty 
 ( ) (1 ) (1 )c Q c      it will suffer if it is successfully prosecuted and so has no legal 
uncertainty with regard to penalties.   
Similar to e.g. Motta and Polo (2003) and Chen and Rey (2013), we assume the cartel 
re-establishes following a successful prosecution. Given this and other assumptions, the 
expected present value of profits of any firm that is a member of the cartel in a given industry 
that has set an overcharge θ is: 
  
   (1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
( )
c Q c c Q c
V
     

   


  (1) 
where, , 0 1    is the discount factor, and  
    (1 )n         (2) 
is what we call the intrinsic difficulty of holding the cartel together.29 
In case of defection, cartel members implement standard grim trigger strategy and set 
the competitive price, c, for ever more. We also assume that defecting firm is immune from 
future prosecution by the CA.30 Since the overcharge set by a cartel could be above the 
monopoly overcharge, M  - for example when a simple revenue-based penalty regime is 
employed - a defecting firm trying to make the maximum profits in the single period before 
the grim trigger strategy is implemented will set the monopoly overcharge whenever the 
cartel overcharge is above the monopoly, but will set an overcharge just a fraction below the 
cartel overcharge whenever this is at or below the monopoly overcharge,  thereby capturing 
the entire cartel profits.  So defection profits are  








   
 
   
  

 .     (3) 
For a cartel to be stable it has to satisfy the cartel stability condition: 
    ( ) dV    .     (4) 
                                                            
29 Intrinsic difficulty parameter was introduced in Katsoulacos et al (2015).  
30 Note the opposite assumption would not affect the main qualitative results of the paper.  
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We now determine how the penalty regime used by the CA affects both the price/overcharge 
set by the cartel and cartel stability/deterrence.  
 
3.2 Analysis of Cartel Pricing 
 
The cartel overcharge will be set so as to maximise ( )V   subject to the cartel stability 
condition (4). This calls for analysis of two situations: unconstrained pricing solutions in 
which the stability condition does not bite; constrained pricing solutions in which the stability 
condition bites.  We analyse these in turn. 
 
3.2.1 Unconstrained Pricing Solutions 
To understand the effects of the penalty regime on the resulting overcharge, we analyse three 
cases: the benchmark case where a CA is absent; the case where a CA is present but operates 
a simple revenue-based penalty; and the case of interest where a CA is present and operates a 
sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime. 
In the absence of CA, maximising expected cartel profits in (1) is equivalent to 
maximising  ( ) (1 )X c Q c    . So a cartel will act like a monopolist and choose   that 
satisfies (5):  
         ( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) 0
1
X Q c cQ c Q c c
      

            
 (5) 
So the monopoly overcharge, M  is the solution to the equation: 
     1(1 )c  


   .     (6) 
Since the RHS of (6) is a strictly decreasing function of θ, it follows that every industry 
satisfying the above assumptions31 has a unique well-defined monopoly overcharge 0M  .   
Clearly the monopoly overcharge can vary across industries, and, in principle, any 0   
could be the monopoly overcharge for some industry.   
In the presence of CA operating a Simple Revenue-Based Penalty Regime with 
penalty rate 0( ) 0     
32
 and toughness 0 0 0    maximising expected cartel profits 
in (1) is equivalent to maximising: 
                                                            
31 Specifically the assumption that the function (.)  is non-decreasing 
32 A simple revenue-based penalty regime is just a special case of the penalty regime considered above where 
the penalty rate function takes the form 
0( )   . 
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             
0 0
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )Y Q c Q c           .
33 34        (7) 
It is easy to see that we have 
     
0 0
( ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
1
Y Q c c c
      

               
.   (8) 
Using (6) and evaluating this expression at M , we get  
     
0





    ;   (9) 
We then have the following result.35 
Proposition 1: Under a simple revenue-based penalty regime: 
(i) In every industry there is a unique unconstrained cartel overcharge, 0̂
C , which is the 
solution to the equation:  












;36       (10) 
(ii) if 0 0    then 0̂
C M  . 
Proposition 1 just re-establishes the result previously proved in Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013), 
Bageri et al. (2013) and Katsoulacos et al. (2015), and highlights the fundamental weakness 
of the simple revenue-based penalty regime. For, evaluated at the monopoly overcharge, 
revenue and hence the penalty that the cartel will pay is a decreasing function of the 
overcharge. By thus effectively punishing cartels less the more harm they cause,  simple 
revenue-based penalty regimes give cartels an incentive to raise the overcharge above the 
monopoly overcharge.   
Finally, in the presence of CA operating a Sophisticated Revenue-Based Penalty 
Regime with penalty rate ( )  ,  which varies with the cartel overcharge, maximizing the 
expected present value of cartel profits in (1) is equivalent to maximizing  
   ( ) (1 ) ( )(1 ) (1 )Z Q c Q c           . So we have 
      ( ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) ( ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) ( )
1
Z Q c c c
           

              
 (11) 
Using (7) we can evaluate this at M  and obtain: 
                                                            
33 Notice    0Y X    
34 Note also that if    
00
Ŷ MAX Y
  , then by envelope theorem we have      0 0 0ˆ ˆˆ 1 1 0C CY Q c          . 
35 For detailed proof of Proposition 1 see appendix 2. 
36 For there to be any solution to this equation we clearly need 1  .  
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   ( )( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )
M
M M M M
M
Z Q c
      

      
 
  (12) 
As noted above, in principle any 0   could be a monopoly overcharge, so if the penalty-
rate function ( )   satisfies the property that:    
    
( ) 1
0
( ) (1 )
 




,     (13) 
then we have ( ) 0MZ    and the following proposition holds. 37 
 
Proposition 2: Under a sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime: 
(i) The unconstrained cartel overcharge, 1̂
C , is a solution to the first-order condition:  










.38     (14) 
(ii)  If    satisfies property (13) then in every industry 1̂C M   
(iii) For the class of sophisticated revenue-based penalty regimes for which  ( , )    is a 
decreasing function of  , in every industry there is a unique solution to (13).   
 
In Figure 1 we illustrate the key results of Propositions 1 and 2 by showing the 
determination of 0 1ˆ ˆ, ,
M C C   .39   
  
                                                            
37 See appendix 2 for detailed proof of Proposition 2. 
38 Note that in the special case of a simple revenue-based penalty regime whereby 0( ) 0    ,  (13) does 
not hold, and, moreover, it follows that  0( , ) ,        and so 1 0ˆ ˆC C M    . 





Figure 1:  Unconstrained Cartel Overcharges in three setups. 
 
Proposition 2 tells us that in order to overcome the disadvantage of the simple 
revenue-based penalty regime whereby the penalty is a decreasing function of the overcharge, 
the CA needs to raise the penalty rate sufficiently fast with the overcharge so that now the 
penalty truly increases with the magnitude of the harm/overcharge and so gives firms an 
incentive to price below the monopoly overcharge. The formula in (13) just makes precise 
what “sufficiently fast” means. Indeed, before proceeding, consider the case of an 
overcharge-based penalty regime as specified in Katsoulacos et al. (2015), whereby a cartel 
that sets an overcharge θ faces an expected penalty ( )O cQ c  . By expressing this as fraction 
of revenue it is easy to see that an overcharge-based penalty regime can be thought of as a 
sophisticated  revenue-based penalty regime where the penalty-rate function is:  
  
 
( ) ( )







 ,     (15) 
which implies   
 (1 )( ) 1 1
( ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
c  






.      (16) 
What this shows is that: 
a) In the unconstrained solution case an overcharge-based penalty regime “works” – 
i.e. generates cartel overcharges below the monopoly overcharge – because it is 
effectively equivalent to a sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime that 
satisfies (13) and so for which Proposition 2 applies. 
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b) However it doesn’t satisfy the legal uncertainty conditions we imposed on a 
sophisticated regime because: 
i. From (15) the level of the penalty-rate function depends on ( )Q c  and so 
would vary across cases.   
ii. From (16) the percentage rate of change of the penalty rate  depends on 
the elasticity function  (1 )c   so varies across cases/ industries.   
Notice that the lower bound on the derivative of the penalty rate function that is given 
by (13) is a function purely of the overcharge and doesn’t depend on industry parameters and 
so any penalty-rate function satisfying this condition can be the same across all industries. 
Obviously, infinitely many functions can satisfy condition (13). The question is how 
to identify the appropriate structure of the penalty rate, which would score sufficiently well 
on all the three assessment criteria (implementability, legal uncertainty and welfare impact).  
An important consideration in picking which particular function to use is that the penalty rate 
function should have a very simple shape otherwise there will be appeals on the grounds that 
there are disproportionate increases in the penalty rate. With this in mind, we consider the 
class of functions satisfying   
( ) 1
, 0
( ) (1 ) (1 )
   





40   (17) 
where ε is a parameter that reflects the strength of desire of the CA to drive price below the 
monopoly price. In order to solve this differential equation we have to specify the value of 
 0 . We set  0 0   on the grounds that, since no harm would be caused with a zero 
overcharge, a positive penalty would be subject to appeal on the grounds of lack of 
proportionality.41 Given this assumption the solution to (17) is 1( ) (1 ) (1 )
    

 
    
, 
where 1 0   is a constant of integration.  But then notice that in the special case where 1   
we have a linear penalty-rate function: 
 1 1( ) , 0      .     (18) 
Consequently, on the grounds of ease of implementation, in what follows we will confine 
attention to this class of linear penalty-rate functions. Similarly to the discussion of the 
                                                            
40 The formula is not dissimilar to that in (16) that arises for overcharge-based penalty regimes, the key 
difference being that the numerator in the second term on the RHS of the expression is industry independent and 
no longer bears any interpretation as an elasticity. 
41 Notice that if we had set (0) 0  , then (17) implies (0)    which would give rise to concerns over 
proportionality of penalties for small overcharges. 
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parameter 0 0  , we will let 1 1   denote the toughness of the sophisticated revenue-
based penalty regime and impose the restriction that 1 1  .  
 
3.2.2 Constrained Pricing Solutions 
We now consider what form of solution might arise when the cartel stability condition 
bites.  Again it helps to consider separately the three cases discussed above. 
If there is no CA (β=0) an unconstrained cartel sets the monopoly price, in which 
case, from (3) the defection profits are just the cartel profits. Then from (1) and (4)  the cartel 
stability condition is given by  
          
( )
( ) 1
      

    (19) 
Hence, this implies constraint on Δ, but not on θ.  So in the absence of CA, cartel overcharge 
M  is given by the solution to equation (6). The overall overcharge in the absence of CA is 
illustrated by the red line in Figure 2. 
With an active CA (β > 0) operating a Simple Revenue-Based Penalty Regime an 
unconstrained cartel sets a price above the monopoly price in which case the defection profits 
are just the monopoly profits. Then, from (1), (4), and footnotes 32 and 33, the cartel stability 
condition becomes: 
         0 0 0





         
 
 , (20) 
where the final inequality follows from footnotes 33, which shows that 0ˆ( )Y   is a decreasing 
function of τ0.  Note as above (20) implies a constraint on Δ, but not on θ.  So, under a simple 
revenue-based penalty regime the cartel overcharge is just the unconstrained overcharge 0̂
C  
for all values of Δ satisfying (20). And the overall overcharge under a Simple Revenue-
Based Penalty Regime is illustrated by the green line in Figure 2. 
With active CA (β > 0) operating a Sophisticated  Revenue-Based Penalty Regime 
following the discussion in sub-section 3.3 we restrict attention to linear sophisticated 
revenue-based penalty regimes 1( )    , which implies an unconstrained overcharge 1̂
C
below the monopoly overcharge M . Then, from (1), (3) and (4) the cartel stability condition 
becomes: 
 













 .    (21) 
This upper bound on θ is a linear decreasing function of Δ taking the value zero when 
11 1    . So there are certainly values of 11     for which the upper bound in (21)  
lies below the unconstrained overcharge. But then the overall cartel overcharge under a 
linear sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime is: 









      
 








  there will be a range of positive values of Δ over which the cartel 
overcharge will be the unconstrained overcharge. Figure 2 illustrates the overall cartel 
overcharge under a sophisticated penalty-based regime by the blue line.   
 
Figure 2:  Cartel Overcharge Under Sophisticated Revenue-Based Penalty Regime 
(blue line); Cartel Overcharge Under Simple Revenue-Based Penalty Regime (green 





3.3 Analysis of Cartel Stability and Deterrence 
As in KMU (2015) we define the critical level of the intrinsic difficulty of holding a 
cartel together,  ,  as the value of Δ below  which stable cartels exist and above which no 
stable cartel exists.42   
From (19) we see that if that there is no active CA (i.e. 0  ) then 1  ; while, from 
(20), if there is an active CA that operates a simple revenue-based penalty regime with 







   , while, from (22), if there is an active CA that operates a 
sophisticated  revenue-based penalty regime with toughness 1  then 1 11 1    . We 
denote the degree of deterrence achieved by an active CA by 1D   ,  which measures the 
fraction of stable cartels that would have formed had there been no CA which now do not 
form in the presence of a CA.   
By taking a first-order Taylor approximation of  
00
ˆ( )Y MAX Y
   around 0 0   it 
is easy to see that the degree of deterrence achieved under a simple revenue-based penalty 
regime is: 
   









  ,   (23)  
while that under a sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime is: 
    1 1 1D    .     (24) 
Comparison of (23) and (24) gives rise to the following: 
Proposition 3: 
(i) The degree of deterrence achieved by a simple revenue-based penalty regime 
varies across industries, being a strictly decreasing function of the monopoly 
overcharge; 
(ii) The degree of deterrence achieved by a linear sophisticated revenue-based 
penalty is the same across all industries.  
So another advantage of our proposed linear sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime 
gives a CA deterrence certainty, while, with the widely-used  simple revenue-based penalty 
regime, it is much harder for a CA to determine the degree of deterrence that it is achieving, 
                                                            
42 This is analogous to the more conventional discussion of deterrence in terms of critical discount rates but 
recognises more explicitly that the other parameter that governs the desirability of defection is the number of 
firms in the industry, n.  
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and it would need to carry out an investigation industry by industry.43 Alternatively, to get 
deterrence certainty with a simple revenue-based penalty regime, the penalty rate would have 
to vary across industries in a way that exactly offset the effects of the varying monopoly 
overcharge. This would give rise to issues of legal uncertainty and consequent appeals. 
Since the sophisticated revenue-based regime achieves the same degree of deterrence 
across all industries while the degree of deterrence is a decreasing function of the (monopoly) 
overcharge for the simple revenue-based penalty regime, we can claim the following:44 
Proposition 4: 
Suppose that the slope of the linear sophisticated revenue-based regime, 1  , is set so 
that:  








    (25) 
 where M  is the average monopoly overcharge. Then, in comparison with the simple 
revenue-based penalty regime, a linear sophisticated revenue-based regime will 
achieve the same degree of deterrence for industries with the average monopoly 
overcharge and higher degrees of deterrence in those industries with above-average 
monopoly overcharges.     
So, in terms of the degree of deterrence, the sophisticated regime works better where it 
matters most.  
To see the potential implications of this for the value of 1 implied by (25) and for the 
levels of penalties to which it gives rise, we first need to determine some estimates of the 
average monopoly overcharge, M . We start from studies of the average cartel overcharge, 
C . A meta-analysis in Connor and Bolotova (2006) suggests a value of 0.31C   while a 
more recent study by Boyer and Kotchoni (2011) that claims to correct for various biases in 
that study gives figures of 13.6% and 17.5%  depending on the sample used.  So we set a 
High estimate of 0.3CH   and a Low estimate of 0.15
C
L  .  If these are cartel overcharges 
emerging under widely used simple revenue-based regimes then, from Proposition 1, the 
average monopoly overcharge will be lower.   
                                                            
43 Note also that as long as the requirements of legal certainty dictate that penalty rates are restricted to being the 
same across all industries then one can no longer employ deterrence equivalence notion introduced in 
Katsoulacos et al. (2015) and set penalty rates in the different regimes so as to achieve deterrence equivalence 
industry by industry. 
44 Proof of Proposition 4 follows immediately (23), (24) and Proposition 3. 
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So let us assume that associated High and Low estimates of this are, respectively 
0.25  and  0.125M MH L   . The typical penalty rate used in simple revenue-based penalty 
regimes is 0 0.1  .  So plugging these figures into (25)  the associated  figures for 1  would 
be 0.5 and 0.9 respectively.   
If we calculate the actual penalty rate that would be charged on cartels setting what 
one took to be the average cartel overcharge, then, if one thought that the average overcharge 
was 0.3CH   the penalty rate that would be applied to the cartel’s revenue under a 
sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime would be 15%, whereas if one thought that the 
average overcharge was 0.15CL   then, under a sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime, 
any cartel setting such an average overcharge would face a penalty equal to 13.5% of its 
revenue.   
Given the linear nature of our proposed sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime 
the penalty rates that would be applied to cartels setting overcharges that were a factor  f  of 
the average cartel overcharge – i.e. for which Cf   would be just 0.15f and 0.135f 
respectively.  So the penalties applied to cartels setting overcharges that were 3 or 4 times the 
average would be facing penalties of around 50% - the sort of figure proposed in a number of 
papers by Connor and Lande – e.g. Connor and Lande (2008).  
In summary, the main conclusion from these calculations is that the precise penalties 
that would be imposed under the linear sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime that we 
propose are not very sensitive to the underlying estimate of the monopoly overcharge that is 
assumed. However penalties do rise quite sharply with the overcharge that is actually set by 
cartels.   
 
4. Comparison with other penalty regimes 
Section 3 provided a detailed comparison of our proposed sophisticated revenue-based 
penalty regime with the simple revenue-based penalty regime that is widely used, 
demonstrating its superiority. As mentioned in Section 2, the regime proposed here is also 
superior to the other potential penalty regimes.   
The first is illegal gains – the difference between the profits that are made by a cartel and 
those that the cartel would have made in the counter-factual situation of competition. These 
counter-factual profits are difficult to estimate which makes this penalty base problematic 
from the point of view of implementability and legal certainty. In Appendix 1 we show that 
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under such a penalty regime cartels would set the monopoly price, so it fares worse than the 
sophisticated penalty regime on this dimension of welfare.  For the special case assumed in 
both this paper and our previous paper – Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015) – where 
the counterfactual profits are zero, then, by suitable choice of penalty rate the illegal gains 
penalty would achieve exactly the same level of deterrence as the sophisticated revenue-
based penalty – this deterrence level also being constant across industries. Thus, the overall 
welfare impact of illegal gains-based penalties are inferior to the regime proposed here (by 
virtue of their impact on cartel pricing) and are also inferior in terms of their 
implementability and legal uncertainty properties.  
The second potential penalty regime is a damages-based penalty regime.  In Appendix 1 
we show that such a regime acts like a combination of a profits-based penalty, an overcharge-
based penalty and an output subsidy, and so has similar welfare properties to the regime 
proposed here, as both set prices below the monopoly price.  However, like an overcharge-
based regime it would be subject to severe implementability and legal uncertainty concerns 
since damages are very difficult to calculate with any precision. .   
 
5. Conclusions 
We conclude that a sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime in which the penalty rate 
that is applied to revenue rises linearly with the level of overcharge that a cartel is found to 
have set, according to a pre-announced formula, will welfare-dominate the existing widely-
used simple revenue-based penalty regime in terms of both the prices that it induces cartels to 
set and the levels of deterrence achieved.  Moreover it is easy to implement and does not give 
rise to legal uncertainty concerns:  the rate at which the penalty rises with the overcharge can 
be readily justified and calculated from publicly available information.  For all these reasons 
we believe that this proposed new regime deserves serious attention and consideration from 






In this Appendix we provide a brief description of penalties based on illegal gains and 
on damages – the latter was not formally examined in Katsoulacos et al. (2015). 
Consider industry with homogeneous product;  demand ( )Q p  and inverse demand 
1( )p Q ;  and constant unit costs 1, 0 (0)c c p  .  The perfectly competitive price and 
output,  0 0,p Q  are defined by  0 0,p c Q Q c  , and so  0 0 0 0p c Q    . 
The monopoly price and output  ,M Mp Q  satisfy    arg max ( ),M M M
p c
p p c Q p Q Q p

   ,  
so  0 0; ; 0M M M M Mp c p Q Q p c Q      . 
The potentially imperfectly competitive  “but-for” price and output  ,B Bp Q  satisfy 
 ,B M B Bc p p Q Q p   , so  0 ; 0M B M B B BQ Q Q p c Q       . 
 
Illegal Gains 
A simple diagram can be used to indicate the difficulties in estimating illegal gains- based 
penalties (see Figure 3). Illegal gains are defined as cartel’s profits over and above the 
counterfactual level of profits.  Since counterfactual level of profits is difficult to estimate 
accurately, in most cases estimation of illegal-gains is likely to be subject to quite significant 
errors. Thus, penalties based on illegal gains have significant implementability problems and 
can create a significant amount of legal uncertainty. 
 




If the industry cartelises and the cartel sets a price 0C Bp p c p     the illegal gains 
are the increase in profits compared to those in the counterfactual “but-for” situation. So the 
illegal gains are given by the area A-B in Figure 3 above, which analytically can be 
represented as          C C B B C C Bp c Q p p c Q p c Q p       .45 Consequently, 
expected profits with penalty rate 0   on Illegal gains are:  
       
     1
C C C C B
C C B
p c Q p p c Q p
p c Q p
 
 
     
     
 
where    (β, 0<β<1, being the probability that the cartel is detected and successfully 
prosecuted by the CA). So if 1    then there is no possibility of getting more than but-for 
profits.  If this first-best outcome is ruled out as being unrealistic and so 1    then cartel sets 
C Mp p . So we can conclude that the welfare properties of these penalties are also not very 
good since they induce cartel prices that are equal to the monopoly level. 
 
Damages 
Damages is the reduction in consumer surplus compared to what would have accrued under 
the counter-factual “but-for” situation. In Figure 3 damages are illustrated by the area A+D 
and so are given by: 
 
              





C B B C
C B C C B C C B B
C C C B B B C
p p Q Q p
p p Q p p p Q p p p Q
p c Q p p p Q p c Q p
 
       
       
 
So, expected profits with penalties on damages are: 
             




C C C C C B B B C
C C C B B B C
p c Q p p c Q p p p Q p c Q p
p c Q p p p Q p c Q p

 
         
            
 
So we can see that: 
 A tax on damages acts like a combination of a tax on profits (first term on expression 
on RHS above), plus an overcharge-based tax (second term on RHS), plus a subsidy 
to output (third term on RHS). 
                                                            
45 Note simple profit based penalty will not provide a proper value for the penalty based on illegal gains as both 
 C Cp c Q  and   C B Cp p Q  overestimate the true illegal gains. 
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 In the “first-best” world where 2  ,  a cartel would set C Bp p  - there is no 
possibility of getting more than but-for profits. 
 In a second-best world where 2   it would set a price below the monopoly price, as 
under an overcharge-based regime.  If the cartel was faced with a penalty on profits 
(first term on RHS only would be relevant) then it would set the monopoly price. The 
second term (tax on overcharge) induces the cartel to reduce price (given the fixed 
counterfactual output volume) and the third term (subsidy on output) induces the 
cartel to increase its output: thus the second and third terms explain why the cartel’s 





Proof of Proposition 1:   (i) follows from setting the derivative in (8) to zero, and noting that  
for all 0 0, 0 1    the function  0,    is a strictly decreasing  function of θ;   (ii) follows 
from (6) and the fact that the function   0,   is a strictly increasing function of 0 with 





Proof of Proposition 2:  (i)  Follows by setting the derivative in (11) equal to zero.  But 
notice that there are implicit restrictions on the nature of the penalty regime to ensure that 






. (ii)  Follows from (6), 
the assumption that the function (.)  is non-decreasing, and the fact that if (13) holds then, 
from (14), 
1











; (iii) also follows from the assumption that the 
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